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Abstract
We prove that the problem of computing an Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium is PPAD-complete
even when all traders use additively separable, piecewise-linear and concave utility functions. In fact,
our proof shows that this market-equilibrium problem does not have a fully polynomial-time appro-
ximation scheme unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in polynomial time.
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1 Introduction
One of the central developments in mathematical economics is the general equilibrium theory, which
provides the foundation for competitive pricing [1, 35]. When specialized to exchange economies, it con-
siders an exchange market in which there are m traders and n divisible goods, where trader i has an
initial endowment of wi,j ≥ 0 of good j and a utility function ui : R
n
+ → R. The individual goal of trader
i is to obtain a new bundle of goods that maximizes her utility. This new bundle can be specified by a
column vector xi ∈ R
n
+, where the j
th entry xi,j is the amount of good j that trader i is able to obtain
after the exchange. Naturally, the exchange should satisfy
∑
i xi,j ≤
∑
iwi,j , for all good j.
The pioneering equilibrium theorem of Arrow and Debreu [1] states that if all the utility functions
u1, ..., um are quasi-concave, then under some mild conditions, the market has an equilibrium price p =
(p1, ..., pm): At this price, independently, each trader can sell her endowment virtually to the market to
obtain a budget and then buys a bundle of goods with this budget from the market — which contains
the union of all goods — that maximizes her utility. The equilibrium condition guarantees that the
supply equals the demand and hence the market clears: Every good is sold and every trader’s budget is
completely spent. In the case when the utility functions are strictly concave, there is a unique optimal
bundle of goods for each trader at any given price p. Nevertheless, the theorem extends to quasi-concave
utility functions such as linear or piecewise linear utility functions [29, 21], even though they are not
strictly quasi-concave, and there could be multiple optimal bundles of goods for each trader at a given
price.
The existence proof of Arrow and Debreu [1], based on Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [28], is non-
constructive in the view of polynomial-time computability. Despite the progress both on algorithms for
and on the complexity-theoretic understanding of market equilibria, several fundamental questions con-
cerning market equilibria, including some seemingly simple ones, remain unsettled.
Vijay Vazirani [31] wrote:
“Concave utility functions, even if they are additively separable over the goods, are not easy
to deal with algorithmically. In fact, obtaining a polynomial time algorithm for such functions
is a premier open question today.”
A function u(x1, ..., xn) from R
n
+ to R is an additively separable and concave function if there exist real-
valued concave functions f1, ..., fn such that
u(x1, ..., xn) =
n∑
j=1
fj(xj).
Noting that every concave function can be approximated by a piecewise linear and concave (PLC) func-
tion, Vazirani [31] further asked whether one can compute a market equilibrium with additively separable
PLC utilities in polynomial time; or whether the problem is PPAD-hard. This open question has been
echoed in several work since then [13, 24, 20, 37].
1
1.1 Our Contribution
In this paper, we settle the complexity of finding an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in an exchange market
with additively separable PLC utilities. We show that this equilibrium problem is PPAD-complete.
For an integer t > 0, a real-valued function f(·) is t-segment piecewise linear over R+ = [0,+∞) if
f is continuous and R+ can be divided into t sub-intervals such that f is a linear function over every
sub-interval. If each trader’s utility is an additively separable t-segment PLC function, then we refer to
the market as a t-linear market. Clearly, a market with linear utilities is a 1-linear market. In contrast
to the fact that an Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium of a 1-linear market can be found in polynomial
time [18, 30, 12, 14, 25], we show that even computing an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in a 2-linear market
is PPAD-complete, via a reduction from Sparse Bimatrix [6]: the problem of finding an approximate
Nash equilibrium in a sparse two-player game (see Section 2.1 for the definition).
Our construction of the PPAD-complete markets has several nice technical elements. First we intro-
duce a sequence of simple linear markets {Mn} with n goods, which we refer to as the price-regulating
markets. Mn has the following nice price-regulation property : If p is a normalized
1 approximate equi-
librium price vector of Mn, then pk ∈ [1, 2] for all k ∈ [n]. This price-regulation property allows us to
encode n free variables x1, ..., xn between 0 and 1 using the n entries of p by setting xk = pk − 1.
As a key step in our analysis, we show that the price-regulation property is stable with respect to
“small perturbations” toMn: When new traders are added toMn (without introducing new goods), this
property remains hold as long as the amount of goods these traders carry with them is small compared
to those of the traders in Mn. We then show how to set the initial endowments and utility functions of
new traders so that we can control the flows of goods in the market and set new requirements that every
approximate equilibrium price vector p has to satisfy.
Using the stability of the price-regulating market, we give a reduction from a two-player game to an
exchange marketM: Given an n×n two-player game (A,B), we construct an additively separable PLC
market by adding new traders — whose initial endowments are relatively small — to M2n+2, the price-
regulating market with 2n + 2 goods. We use the first 2n entries of p to encode a pair of probability
vectors (x,y): xk = pk − 1 and yk = pn+k − 1, k ∈ [n]. We then develop a novel way to enforce the Nash
equilibrium constraints over A, B, x and y by carefully specifying the behaviors of the new traders. In
doing so, we construct a marketM with the property that from every approximate market equilibrium p
ofM, the pair (x,y) obtained above (after normalization) is an approximate Nash equilibrium of (A,B).
Moreover, if (A,B) is a sparse two-player game, then the relation of which traders are interested in which
goods in M is also sparse (see Section 2.3 for details).
In the construction of M, the price-regulation property plays a critical role. It enables us to design
the utility functions of new traders so that we know exactly their preferences over the goods with respect
to any approximate equilibrium price p, even though we have no idea in advance about the entries of p
when constructing M.
We anticipate that our reduction techniques will help to resolve more complexity-theoretic questions
concerning other families of exchange markets such as the general CES markets and the hybrid linear-
Leontief markets [7].
1We say a price vector p is normalized if the smallest nonzero entry of p is equal to 1.
2
1.2 Related Work
The computation of a market equilibrium price in an exchange market has been a challenging problem
in mathematical economics [34, 31]. The matter is more complex because some markets only have irra-
tional equilibria, making the computation of exact equilibria with a finite-precision algorithm impossible.
One alternative approach to handle irrationality is to express equilibria in some simple algebraic form.
However, it turns out that finding an exact market equilibrium in general is not computable [33].
To circumvent the irrationality, one usually uses some notion of approximate market equilibria. There
are various notions of approximate equilibria: Some require that the approximation solution is within a
small geometric distance from an exact equilibrium, while others only require that the supply-demand
condition and/or the individual optimality condition are approximately satisfied. In this paper, following
Scarf [34], we consider the latter notion of approximate market equilibria.
1.2.1 Algorithms for Market Equilibria
Scarf pioneered the algorithmic development for computing general competitive equilibria [34]. His ap-
proach combined numerical approximation with combinatorial insights used in Sperner’s lemma [36] for
fixed points and in Lemke and Howson’s algorithm for two-player games. Although his algorithm may
not always run in polynomial time, Scarf’s work has profound impact to computational economics.
Building on the success of convex programming [18], polynomial-time algorithms have been developed
for special markets whose sets of equilibria enjoy some degree of convexity. For Arrow-Debreu markets
with linear utility functions, Nenakov and Primak gave a polynomial-time algorithm [30], and there are
now several polynomial-time algorithms for computing or approximating market equilibria with linear
utility functions [12, 14, 25, 19, 26, 15, 39]. Other polynomial-time algorithms for special markets include
Eaves’s algorithm for Cobb-Douglas markets [17] and Devanur and Vazirani’s algorithm for markets with
spending constraint utilities [16] (also see [37]). The convex programming based approach for approx-
imating equilibria has been extended to all markets whose utilities satisfy weak gross substitutability
(WGS) by Codenotti, Pemmaraju, and Varadarajan [10]. In [9], Codenotti, McCune, and Varadarajan
showed that for markets that satisfy WGS, there is a price-adjustment mechanism called taˆonnement
that converges to an approximate equilibrium efficiently.
A closely related market model is Fisher’s model [2]. In this model, there are two different types of
traders in the market: producers and consumers. Each consumer comes to the market with a budget
and a utility function. Each producer comes to the market with an endowment of goods, and will sell
them to the consumers for money. A market equilibrium is then a price vector p for goods so that if
each consumer spends all her budget to maximize her utility, then the market clears. An (approximate)
market equilibrium in a Fisher’s market with CES2 utility functions [18, 39, 38, 14, 27] or with piecewise
2CES (standing for constant elasticity of substitution) is a popular family of utility functions. Let s > 0 be a parameter
called the elasticity of substitution, then a CES function with elasticity of substitution s has the following form:
u(x1, ..., xm) =
 
mX
j=1
djx
r
j
!1/r
, where r =
s− 1
s
.
3
linear utility functions [38] can be found in polynomial time. In [3], Chen, Deng, Sun, and Yao gave an
algorithm for markets with logarithmic utility functions. Its running time is polynomial when either the
number of sellers or the number of buyers is bounded by a constant.
However, progress on Arrow-Debreu markets whose sets of equilibria do not enjoy convexity has been
relatively slow. There are only a few algorithms in this category. Devanur and Kannan [13] gave a poly-
nomial-time algorithm for exchange markets with PLC utility functions and a constant number of goods.
Codenotti, McCune, Penumatcha, and Varadarajan gave a polynomial-time algorithm for CES markets
when the elasticity of substitution s ≥ 1/2 [8].
1.2.2 The Complexity of Equilibrium Problems
Papadimitriou initiated the complexity-theoretic study of fixed-point computations [32]. He introduced
the complexity class PPAD, and proved that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player
game, the computational version of Sperner’s Lemma, and the problem of computing an approximate
fixed point are members of PPAD.
Recently, there was a series of developments that characterized the computational complexity of se-
veral equilibrium problems in game theory. Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [22] proved that
the problem of computing an exponentially-precise Nash equilibrium of a four-player game is PPAD-
complete. Chen and Deng [4] then proved that the problem of computing a two-player Nash equilibrium
is also PPAD-complete. Chen and Deng’s result, together with an earlier reduction of [11], implies that
computing a market equilibrium in an Arrow-Debreu market with Leontief utilities 3 is PPAD-hard. On
the approximation front, Chen, Deng and Teng [5] proved that it is PPAD-complete to find a polyno-
mially-precise approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player or multi-player games. Huang and Teng [24]
then extended this approximation result to Leontief market equilibria. Their approximation result also
implies that the market equilibrium problem with CES utility functions is PPAD-hard, if the elasticity
of substitution s is sufficiently small.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Sparse Two-Player Games
A two-player game is defined by the payoff matrices (A,B) of its two players. In this paper, we assume
that both players have n choices of actions and hence both A and B are square matrices with n rows
and columns. We use ∆n ⊂ Rn to denote the set of probability distributions of n dimensions. A pair
of probability vectors (x,y) (i.e., x ∈ ∆n and y ∈ ∆n) is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B) if for all i and j
in [n] = {1, 2, ..., n}, Aiy
T < Ajy
T =⇒ xi = 0 and xBi < xBj =⇒ yi = 0, where we use Ai and Bi to
denote the ith row vector of A and the ith column vector of B, respectively. We will use the following
notion of approximate Nash equilibria.
3Leontief functions are special cases of CES functions with s approaching 0. A Leontief function has the following form:
u(x1, ..., xm) = minj∈S xj/dj , where S ⊆ [m] is a subset of goods and dj > 0 for all j ∈ S.
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Definition 1 (Well-Supported Nash Equilibria). For ǫ > 0, (x,y) is an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium
of (A,B), if x,y ∈ ∆n and for all i, j ∈ [n],
Aiy
T + ǫ < Ajy
T =⇒ xi = 0, and (1)
xBi + ǫ < xBj =⇒ yi = 0. (2)
Definition 2 (Sparse Normalized Two-Player Games). A two-player game (A,B) is normalized if every
entry of A and B is between −1 and 1. We say a two-player game (A,B) is sparse if every row and
every column of A and B have at most 10 nonzero entries.
Let Sparse Bimatrix denote the problem of finding an n−6-well-supported Nash equilibrium in an
n× n sparse normalized two-player game, then we have
Theorem 1 (Chen-Deng-Teng [6]). Sparse Bimatrix is PPAD-complete.
2.2 Markets with Additively Separable PLC Utilities
Let G = {G1, ..., Gn} denote a set of n divisible goods, and T = {T1, ..., Tm} denote a set of m traders.
For each trader Ti ∈ T , we use wi ∈ R
n
+ to denote her initial endowment, ui : R
n
+ → R+ to denote her
utility function, and xi ∈ R
N
+ to denote her allocation vector. In this paper, we will focus on markets
with additively separable piecewise linear and concave utilities.
Definition 3. A function r(·) : R+ → R+ is said to be t-segment piecewise linear and concave (PLC) if
1. r(0) = 0 and r(·) is continuous over R+;
2. there exists a tuple of length 2t+ 1,
[
θ0 > θ1 > ... > θt; a1 < a2 < ... < at
]
∈ R2t+1+ , such that
(a) for any i ∈ [0 : t− 1], the restriction of f over [ai, ai+1] (a0 = 0) is a segment of slope θi;
(b) the restriction of f over [at,+∞) is a ray of slope θt.
The 2t+ 1-tuple [θ0, θ1, ..., θt; a1, a2, ..., at] is also called the representation of r(·). Moreover, we say r(·)
is strictly monotone if θt > 0, and is α-bounded for some α ≥ 1 if
α ≥ θ0 > θ1 > ... > θt ≥ 1.
Definition 4. A utility function u(·) : Rn+ → R+ is said to be an additively separable PLC function if
there exist a set of n PLC functions r1(·), ..., rn(·) : R+ → R+ such that
u(x) =
∑
j∈[n]
rj(xj), for all x ∈ R
n
+. (3)
In such a market, we use, for each trader Ti ∈ T , ri,j(·) : R+ → R+ to denote her PLC function with
respect to good Gj ∈ G. In another word, we have
ui(x) =
∑
j∈[n]
ri,j(xj), for all x ∈ R
n
+.
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We use p ∈ Rn+ to denote a price vector, where p 6= 0 and pj is the price of Gj , j ∈ [n]. We always
assume that p is normalized, that is, the smallest nonzero entry of p is equal to 1.
Given p, we use OPT(i,p) ⊂ Rn+ to denote the set of allocations that maximize the utility of Ti:
OPT(i,p) = argmax
x∈Rn
+
, x·p≤wi·p
ui(x).
We use X = {xi ∈ R
n
+ : i ∈ [m]} to denote an allocation of the market: For each trader Ti ∈ T , xi ∈ R
n
+
is the amount of goods that Ti receives. In particular, the amount of Gj that Ti receives in X is xi,j.
Definition 5 (Arrow-Debreu [1]). A market equilibrium is a (normalized) price vector p ∈ Rn+ such that
there exists an allocation X which has the following properties:
1. The market clears: For every good Gj ∈ G,
∑
i∈[m]
xi,j ≤
∑
i∈[m]
wi,j. (4)
In particular, if pj > 0, then ∑
i∈[m]
xi,j =
∑
i∈[m]
wi,j. (5)
2. Every trader gets an optimal bundle: For every Ti ∈ T , we have xi ∈ OPT(i,p).
In general, not every market has such an equilibrium price vector. For the additively separable PLC
markets considered here, the following condition guarantees the existence of an equilibrium.
Definition 6 (Economy Graphs). Given an additively separable PLC market, we build a directed graph
G = (T , E) as follows. The vertex set of G is exactly T , the set of traders in the market. For every two
traders Ti 6= Tj ∈ T , we have an edge from Ti to Tj if there exists an integer k ∈ [n] such that wi,k > 0
and rj,k(·) is strictly monotone. In another word, Ti possesses a good which Tj wants. G is called the
economy graph of the market [29, 8]. We say the market is strongly connected if G is strongly connected.
The following theorem is a corollary of Maxfield [29], and the proof can be found in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. Let M be a market with additively separable PLC utilities. If it is strongly connected, then
a market equilibrium p exists. Moreover, if all the parameters of M are rational numbers, then it has a
rational market equilibrium p. The number of bits we need to describe p is polynomial in the input size
of M (that is, the number of bits we need to describe the market M).
2.3 Definition of the Sparse Market Equilibrium Problem
By Theorem 2, the following search problem Market is well defined:
The input of the problem is an additively separable PLC market M that is both rational
and strongly connected; and the output is a rational market equilibrium p of M.
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In the rest of the section, we define a much more restricted version of Market: Sparse Market. The
main result of the paper is that Sparse Market is PPAD-complete.
First of all, the input of Sparse Market is an additively separable PLC market which not only is
strongly connected, but also satisfies the following three conditions:
Definition 7 (α-Bounded Markets). We say an additively separable PLC market M is α-bounded, for
some α ≥ 1, if for all Ti and Gj , ri,j(·) is either the zero function (ri,j(x) = 0 for all x) or α-bounded.
Definition 8 (2-Linear Markets). We call an additively separable PLC market M a 2-linear market if
for all Ti ∈ T and Gj ∈ G, ri,j(·) has at most two segments.
Definition 9 (t-Sparse Markets). We say an additively separable PLC market M is t-sparse for some
integer t > 0 if 1) For every Ti ∈ T , we have |supp(wi)| ≤ t; and 2) For every Ti ∈ T , the number of
j ∈ [n] such that ri,j(·) is not the zero function is at most t. In another word, every trader owns at most
t goods at the beginning and is interested in at most t goods.
We use the following definition of approximate market equilibria:
Definition 10 (ǫ-Approximate Market Equilibrium). Given an additively separable PLC market M, we
say p is an ǫ-approximate market equilibrium of M, for some ǫ ≥ 0, if there is an allocation X = {xi ∈
R
n
+ : i ∈ [m]} such that every trader gets an optimal bundle with respect to p: xi ∈ OPT(i,p) for all i ∈
[m]; and the market clears approximately: For every Gj ∈ G,
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈[m]
xi,j −
∑
i∈[m]
wi,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ ·
∑
i∈[m]
wi,j. (6)
We remark that there are various notions of approximate market equilibria. The reason we adopted
the one above is to simplify the analysis. The construction in Section 4 actually works for some other
notions of approximate equilibria, e.g., the one that also allows the allocation to be just approximately
optimal for each trader.
Finally, we let Sparse Market denote the following search problem:
The input of the problem is a 2-linear market M that is strongly connected, 27-bounded,
and 23-sparse; and the output is an n−13-approximate market equilibrium of M, where n
is the number of goods in the market.
It is tedious but not very hard to show that Sparse Market is a problem in PPAD 4.
4In [21], the author showed how to construct a continuous map from any market with quasi-concave utilities such that
the set of fixed points of the map is precisely the set of equilibria of the market. When the market is additively separable
PLC, one can show that the continuous map is indeed Lipschitz continuous. As a result, one can reduce the problem of
finding an approximate market equilibrium to the problem of finding an approximate fixed point in a Lipschitz continuous
map. This implies a reduction from Sparse Market to the discrete fixed point problem studied in [23] (also see [5] for the
high-dimensional version) which is in PPAD, and thus, the former is also in PPAD.
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One can in fact replace the constant 27 here by any constant larger than 1 and our main result,
Theorem 3, below still holds. The constant 23, however, is related to the constant 10 in Definition 2.
The main result of the paper is the following theorem:
Theorem 3 (Main). Sparse Market is PPAD-complete.
3 A Price-Regulating Market
We now construct the family of price-regulating market {Mn}. For each positive integer n ≥ 2,Mn has
n goods and satisfies the following strong price regulation property.
Property 1 (Price Regulation). A price vector p is a normalized n−1-approximate equilibrium of Mn
if and only if 1 ≤ pk ≤ 2, for all k ∈ [n].
We start with some notation. The goods in Mn are G = {G1, ..., Gn}, and the traders in Mn are
T =
{
Ts : s ∈ S
}
, where S =
{
s = (i, j) : 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n
}
.
For every trader Ts ∈ T , we use ws ∈ R
n
+ to denote her initial endowment, us : R
n
+ → R+ to denote her
utility function, rs,k(·) to denote her PLC function with respect to Gk, and OPT(s,p) to denote the set
of bundles that maximize her utility with respect to p.
Market Mn is a linear market in which for all s ∈ S and k ∈ [n], rs,k(·) is a ray starting at (0, 0). In
the construction below, we let rs,k(·) ⇐ [θ] denote the action of setting rs,k(·) to be the linear function
of slope θ ≥ 0.
Construction of Mn:
First, we set the initial endowment vectors ws: For every s = (i, j) ∈ S, we set ws,k = 1/n if k = i;
and ws,k = 0 otherwise.
Second, we set the PLC functions rs,k(·): For all s = (i, j) ∈ S and k ∈ [n], we set rs,k(·) ⇐ [θ] and
θ = 0 if k 6= i, j; θ = 1 if k = j; and θ = 2 if k = i.
It is easy to check that Mn constructed above is strongly connected, 2-bounded, and 2-sparse.
Proof of Property 1. The first direction is trivial. If 1 ≤ pk ≤ 2 for all k ∈ [n], then one can verify that
X =
{
xs = ws : s ∈ S
}
is a market clearing allocation that provides an optimal bundle of goods for each trader at price p.
The second direction is less trivial. Let p be a normalized (1/n)-approximate market equilibrium of
Mn, and X be an optimal allocation that clears the market. First, it is easy to check that pk must be
positive for all k ∈ [n] since otherwise, we have xs,k = +∞ for all s = (i, j) such that k = i or j, which
contradicts the assumption that p is an approximate equilibrium.
Since p is normalized, we have pk ≥ 1 for all k ∈ [n]. Now assume for contradiction that Property 1
is not true, then without loss of generality, we may assume that p1 = maxk pk > 2 and p2 = mink pk = 1.
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To reach a contradiction, we focus on the amount of G1 each trader gets in the allocation X . First, if
1 /∈ {i, j} where s = (i, j), then we have xs,1 = 0; Second, if i = 1 and j = 2, then xs,1 = 0 since
2
p1
<
1
p2
and Ts likes G2 better than G1 with respect to the price vector p; Third, if j = 1, then xs,1 = 0 since
1
p1
<
2
pi
and Ts likes Gi better than G1; Finally, for all s = (i, j) such that i = 1 and j 6= 2, we have xs,1 ≤ 1/n
since the budget of Ts is exactly (1/n) · p1. As a result, we have
∑
s∈S
xs,1 ≤
n− 2
n
, while
∑
s∈S
ws,1 =
n− 1
n
,
which contradicts the assumption that p is a (1/n)-approximate equilibrium since
∣∣∣∣n− 2n −
n− 1
n
∣∣∣∣ > 1n ·
n− 1
n
.
The price-regulation property then follows.
Let xk = pk − 1 for k ∈ [n], then Mn provides us a way to encode n free variables x1, ..., xn between
0 and 1. In the next section, we will useM2n+2 and the first 2n entries of p:
xk = pk − 1 and yk = pn+k − 1, for k ∈ [n],
to encode a pair of distributions (x,y). Starting from an n × n sparse two-player game (A,B), we will
show how to add more traders to “perturb” the price-regulating marketM2n+2 so that any approximate
equilibrium p of the new market yields an approximate Nash equilibrium (x,y) of (A,B).
4 Reduction from Sparse Bimatrix to Sparse Market
In this section, we give a polynomial-time reduction from Sparse Bimatrix to Sparse Market. Given
an n × n sparse two-player game (A,B), where A,B ∈ [−1, 1]n×n, we construct an additively separable
PLC market M by adding more traders to the price-regulating market M2n+2. There are 2n+ 2 goods
G = {G1, ..., G2n, G2n+1, G2n+2} in M, and the traders T in M are
T =
{
Ts, Tu, Tv, Ti : s ∈ S,u ∈ U,v ∈ V, i ∈ [2n]
}
,
where S =
{
s = (i, j) : 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n + 2
}
,
U =
{
u = (i, j, 1) : 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n
}
and V =
{
v = (i, j, 2) : 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n
}
.
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Note that |T | = O(n2). The traders Ts, where s ∈ S, have almost the same initial endowments ws and
PLC functions rs,k(·) as in M2n+2; we will only slightly modify these parameters to ease the analysis in
the next section.
For each agent T ∈ T , we will set her PLC function r(·) with respect to Gk, k ∈ [2n + 2], to one of
the following functions:
1. r(·) is the zero function: r(x) = 0 for all x ≥ 0 (denoted by r(·)⇐ [0]); or
2. r(·) is a ray: r(x) = θ · x for all x ≥ 0 (denoted by r(·)⇐ [θ]); or
3. r(·) is a 2-segment PLC function with representation [θ0, θ1; a1] (denoted by r(·)⇐ [θ0, θ1; a1]).
4.1 Setting up the Market
For each trader T ∈ T , we set her initial endowment and PLC utility functions as following:
4.1.1 Traders Ts, where s ∈ S
For each trader Ts ∈ T , where s = (i, j) ∈ S, we set her initial endowments ws and her PLC functions
rs,k(·) almost the same as hers in M2n+2.
The initial endowment ws is set as: ws,k = 1/n if k = i; and ws,k = 0 otherwise, where k ∈ [2n + 2].
The PLC functions rs,k(·) is set as: rs,k(·) ⇐ [θ] and θ = 0 if k /∈ {i, j}; θ = 1 if k = j; and θ = 2 if
k = i, where k ∈ [2n + 2].
4.1.2 Traders Tu, where u ∈ U
Let u = (i, j, 1) be a triple in U with 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n. We use Ai and Aj to denote the ith and jth row
vectors of A, respectively. We define C and D to be the following n-dimensional vectors: For k ∈ [n],
(Ck,Dk) = (Ai,k −Aj,k, 0) if Ai,k −Aj,k ≥ 0; and (Ck,Dk) = (0, Aj,k −Ai,k) otherwise.
By definition, we have C−D = Ai−Aj while both vectors C and D are nonnegative. Moreover, because
A is a sparse matrix, the number of nonzero entries in either C or D is at most 20 and every entry is
between 0 and 2. We also let E and F be the following two nonnegative numbers:
(E,F ) =

∑
k∈[n]
Dk −
∑
k∈[n]
Ck, 0

 if ∑
k∈[n]
Dk ≥
∑
k∈[n]
Ck; (E,F ) =

0, ∑
k∈[n]
Ck −
∑
k∈[n]
Dk

 otherwise.
Accordingly, we have E,F ≥ 0 and
E +
∑
k∈[n]
Ck = F +
∑
k∈[n]
Dk.
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Moreover, since C and D are sparse, we also have
0 ≤ E,F ≤ max

∑
k∈[n]
Ck,
∑
k∈[n]
Dk

 ≤ 40.
We set the initial endowment vector wu = (wu,1, ..., wu,2n+1, wu,2n+2) of Tu as follows:
1. wu,i = 1/n
4; wu,k = wu,2n+2 = 0 for all other k ∈ [n];
2. wu,n+k = Ck/n
5 for all k ∈ [n]; and
3. wu,2n+1 = E/n
5.
It is easy to verify that the number of nonzero entries in wu is at most 22.
We set the PLC utility functions ru,k(·), where k ∈ [2n+ 2], of Tu as follows:
1. ru,i(·)⇐ [9, 1; 1/n
4]; and ru,k(·)⇐ [0] for all other k ∈ [n];
2. ru,2n+2(·)⇐ [3];
3. ru,n+k(·)⇐ [0] for all k ∈ [n] such that Dk = 0;
4. ru,n+k(·)⇐ [27, 1;Dk/n
5] for all k ∈ [n] such that Dk > 0; and
5. ru,2n+1(·)⇐ [0] if F = 0; and ru,2n+1(·)⇐ [27, 1;F/n
5] if F > 0.
Note that the number of k ∈ [2n + 2] such that ru,k(·) is not the zero function is at most 23.
The constants 1, 3, 9 and 27 in the construction may look strange at first sight. The motivation is
that, if the price-regulation property still holds for the new marketM (which turns out to be true), then
we know exactly the preference of Tu over the goods since 3 > 2. See the proof of Lemma 4 for more
details.
4.1.3 Traders Tv, where v ∈ V
The behavior of Tv, v ∈ V , is very similar to that of Tu except that it works on the second matrix B.
Let v = (i, j, 2) be a triple in V with 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n. We use Bi and Bj to denote the ith and jth
column vectors of B, respectively. Similarly, we define the following n-dimensional vectors C and D:
(Ck,Dk) = (Bk,i −Bk,j, 0) if Bk,i −Bk,j ≥ 0; and (Ck,Dk) = (0, Bk,j −Bk,i) otherwise.
As a result, we have C−D = Bi −Bj while both C and D are nonnegative. We also define E,F ≥ 0 in
a similar way so that
E +
∑
k∈[n]
Ck = F +
∑
k∈[n]
Dk and 0 ≤ E,F ≤ 40.
We set the initial endowment vector wv = (wv,1, ..., wv,2n+1, wv,2n+2) of Tv to be
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1. wv,n+i = 1/n
4; wv,n+k = wv,2n+2 = 0 for all other k ∈ [n];
2. wv,k = Ck/n
5 for all k ∈ [n]; and
3. wv,2n+1 = E/n
5.
We set the PLC utility functions rv,k(·), where k ∈ [2n + 2], of Tv as follows:
1. rv,n+i(·)⇐ [9, 1; 1/n
4]; and rv,n+k(·)⇐ [0] for all other k ∈ [n];
2. rv,2n+2(·)⇐ [3];
3. rv,k(·)⇐ [0] for all k ∈ [n] such that Dk = 0;
4. rv,k(·)⇐ [27, 1;Dk/n
5] for all k ∈ [n] such that Dk > 0; and
5. rv,2n+1(·)⇐ [0] if F = 0; and rv,2n+1(·)⇐ [27, 1;F/n
5] if F > 0.
Again, the number of nonzero entries in wv is at most 22, and the number of indices k such that rv,k(·)
is not the zero function is at most 23.
4.1.4 Traders Ti, where i ∈ [2n]
Finally, for each i ∈ [2n], we set the initial endowment vector wi = (wi,1, ..., wi,2n+2) of Ti as follows:
wi,2n+1 = 1/n
12 and wi,k = 0, for all other k ∈ [2n+ 2].
We set the PLC utility functions ri,k(·), where k ∈ [2n + 2], of Ti as follows:
ri,i(·)⇐ [1] and ri,k(·)⇐ [0], for all other k ∈ [2n+ 2].
4.2 From Approximate Market Equilibria to Approximate Nash Equilibria
By definition,M is a 2-linear additively separable PLC market which is strongly connected, 27-bounded
and 23-sparse. Let N = 2n+ 2, the number of goods in M. To prove Theorem 3, we only need to show
that from any N−13-approximate market equilibrium p of M, one can construct an n−6-well-supported
Nash equilibrium (x,y) of (A,B) in polynomial time. To this end, let (x′,y′) denote the following two
n-dimensional vectors:
x′k = pk − 1 and y
′
k = pn+k − 1, for all k ∈ [n]. (7)
Then, we normalize (x′,y′) to get a pair of distributions (x,y) (we will show later that x′,y′ 6= 0):
xk =
x′k∑
i∈[n] x
′
i
and yk =
y′k∑
i∈[n] y
′
i
, for all k ∈ [n]. (8)
Theorem 3 follows directly from Theorem 4 which we will prove in the next section. Note that if p is a
N−13-approximate equilibrium, then it is also an n−13-approximate equilibrium by definition.
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Theorem 4. If p is an n−13-approximate market equilibrium of M, then (x,y) constructed above is an
n−6-well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A,B).
5 Correctness of the Reduction
In this section, we prove Theorem 4. Let p = (p1, ..., p2n+2) be an normalized n
−13-approximate market
equilibrium of M. By the same argument used earlier, we can prove that pk > 0 for all k ∈ [2n + 2].
Therefore, we have pk ≥ 1 for all k and mink pk = 1. Let X be an optimal allocation with respect to p
that clears the market approximately:
X =
{
as,au,av,ai ∈ R
2n+2
+ : s ∈ S,u ∈ U,v ∈ V, i ∈ [2n]
}
.
We start with the following notation. Let T ′ ⊆ T be a subset of traders, and k ∈ [2n + 2]. We use
wk[T
′] to denote the amount of good Gk that traders in T
′ possess at the beginning and ak[T
′] to denote
the amount of good Gk that T
′ receives in the final allocation X .
According to our construction, wk[T ] ∈ [2, 3] for every k ∈ [2n + 2]. Because X clears the market
approximately, we have
∣∣wk[T ]− ak[T ]∣∣ ≤ wk[T ]/n13 ≤ 3/n13, for all k ∈ [2n + 2]. (9)
We further divide the traders into two groups: T1 = {Ts : s ∈ S} and T2 = T − T1. Then (9) implies
∣∣wk[T1]− ak[T1] + wk[T2]− ak[T2]∣∣ ≤ 3/n13, for all k ∈ [2n + 2]. (10)
5.1 The Price-Regulation Property
First, we show that, the price vector p must still satisfy the price-regulation property as in the price-
regulating market M2n+2. We will use the fact that traders in T1 possess almost all the goods in M.
Lemma 1 (Price Regulation). For all k ∈ [2n+ 2], 1 ≤ pk ≤ 2.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that p does not satisfies the price-regulation property. Then without
loss of generality, we assume that p1 = maxk pk > 2 and p2 = 1.
By the same argument used in the proof of Property 1, we have
w1[T1] = (2n+ 1) ·
1
n
, a1[T1] ≤ 2n ·
1
n
, and thus, w1[T1]− a1[T1] ≥
1
n
.
By (10), we have
w1[T2]− a1[T2] ≤ −
1
n
+
3
n13
=⇒ a1[T2] ≥ w1[T2] +
1
n
−
3
n13
≥
1
n
−
3
n13
(11)
because w1[T2] ≥ 0. However, this cannot be true since the amount of goods the traders in T2 possess at
13
the beginning is much smaller compared to 1/n. Even if they spend all the money on G1, we still have
a1[T2] ≤
∑
k∈[2n+2] pk · wk[T2]
p1
≤
∑
k∈[2n+2]
wk[T2] = O(n
−2)≪
1
n
,
since we assumed that p1 = maxk pk. This contradicts with (11).
5.2 Relations between pk and wk[T2]− ak[T2]
Next, we prove two very useful relations between pk and wk[T2]− ak[T2].
Lemma 2. Let p be a normalized n−13-approximate market equilibrium and X be an optimal allocation
that clears the market approximately. If wk[T2]− ak[T2] > 3/n
13 for some k ∈ [2n + 2], then pk = 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we prove the lemma for the case when k = 1. By (10), we have
w1[T1]− a1[T1] < 0.
This means that, in the market participated by traders Ts, the amount of G1 which they would like to
buy is strictly more than the amount of G1 they possess at the beginning. Intuitively this implies that
the price p1 of G1 is lower than what it should be, and indeed we show below that p1 = mink pk = 1.
On one hand, by the construction, only the following traders Ts are interested in G1:
S1 = {s = (1, j) : j 6= 1} and S2 = {s = (i, 1) : i 6= 1}.
On the other hand, we have
a1[Ts, s ∈ S1] ≤ w1[Ts, s ∈ S1] = w1[T1]
due to the budget limitation. As a result, there must exist an s = (i, 1) ∈ S2 such that as,1 > 0. Since as
is an optimal bundle for Ts with respect to p, we have
1
p1
≥
2
pi
=⇒ p1 ≤
pi
2
.
By Lemma 1, the price-regulation property, we conclude that p1 = 1 and the lemma is proved.
Lemma 3. Let p be a normalized n−13-approximate market equilibrium and X be an optimal allocation
that clears the market approximately. If wk[T2]− ak[T2] < −3/n
13 for some k ∈ [2n+ 2], then pk = 2.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we prove the lemma for the case when k = 1. By (10), we have
w1[T1]− a1[T1] > 0.
This means that, in the market participated by traders Ts, the amount of G1 which they would like to
buy is strictly less than the amount of G1 they possess at the beginning. Intuitively, this implies that
the price p1 of G1 is higher than what it should be, and indeed we show below that p1 = 2 = maxk pk.
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Since a1[T1] < w1[T1], there must exist a j ∈ [2n+ 2] with j 6= 1 such that s = (1, j) and
as,1 < ws,1.
(Otherwise a1[T1] ≥ w1[T1]). This means that Ts spends some of its money to buy Gj and thus,
1
pj
≥
2
p1
=⇒ p1 ≥ 2pj .
By Lemma 1, the price-regulation property, we conclude that p1 = 2 and the lemma is proved.
We also need the following two lemmas. We only prove the first one. The second one can be proved
symmetrically.
Lemma 4. Let u = (i, j, 1) be a triple in U and u′ = (j, i, 1) ∈ U . Then for any k ∈ [2n+ 1], we have
wu,k + wu′,k ≥ au,k + au′,k. (12)
Lemma 5. Let v = (i, j, 2) be a triple in V and v′ = (j, i, 2) ∈ V . Then for any k ∈ [2n + 1], we have
wv,k + wv′,k ≥ av,k + av′,k.
Proof of Lemma 4. Without loss of generality, we only need to prove Lemma 4 for the case when u =
(1, 2, 1) and u′ = (2, 1, 1). Let C and D denote the following two n-dimensional vectors: For k ∈ [n],
(Ck,Dk) = (A1,k −A2,k, 0) if A1,k −A2,k ≥ 0; and (Ck,Dk) = (0, A2,k −A1,k) otherwise. (13)
We also define E and F to be the following two nonnegative numbers:
(E,F ) =

∑
k∈[n]
Dk −
∑
k∈[n]
Ck, 0

 if ∑
k∈[n]
Dk ≥
∑
k∈[n]
Ck; (E,F ) =

0, ∑
k∈[n]
Ck −
∑
k∈[n]
Dk

 otherwise.
(14)
Then by the construction, we have wu,n+k = Ck/n
5 and wu′,n+k = Dk/n
5 for all k ∈ [n],
wu,1 = wu′,2 = 1/n
4, wu,2n+1 = E/n
5, wu′,2n+1 = F/n
5,
and all other entries of wu and wu′ are 0.
We now focus on the preference of Tu. After selling its initial endowment, the budget of Tu is
p1 ·
1
n4
+
∑
k∈[n]
pn+k ·
Ck
n5
+ p2n+1 ·
E
n5
= Ω
(
1
n4
)
by Lemma 1. The PLC utility functions ru,k(·) of Tu are designed carefully, so that even though we do
not know what exactly p is, we know the behavior of Tu due to the price-regulation property: Tu first
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buys the following bundle of goods from the market
{Dk
n5
amount of Gn+k and
F
n5
amount of G2n+1 : k ∈ [n]
}
. (15)
As D has at most 20 nonzero entries and every entry is between 0 and 2, the cost of this bundle is
∑
k∈[n]
pn+k ·
Dk
n5
+ p2n+1 ·
F
n5
= O
(
1
n5
)
≪
1
n4
.
Tu then buys as much G1 as it can up to 1/n
4, and spends all the money left, if any, on G2n+2.
The behavior of Tu′ is similar. It first buys the following bundle of goods from the market:
{Ck
n5
amount of Gn+k and
E
n5
amount of G2n+1 : k ∈ [n]
}
. (16)
It then buys as much G2 as it can up to 1/n
4, and spends all the money left, if any, on G2n+2.
Now we are ready to prove the lemma. The case when k ∈ [n] but k 6= 1, 2 is trivial since
wu,k = wu′,k = au,k = au′,k = 0.
When k = 1, we have wu,1 + wu′,1 = 1/n
4, au′,1 = 0, au,1 ≤ 1/n
4 and thus, (12) follows. The case when
k = 2 can be proved similarly. For the case of n+ k where k ∈ [n], we have
wu,n+k =
Ck
n5
, wu′,n+k =
Dk
n5
, au,n+k =
Dk
n5
, and au′,n+k =
Ck
n5
,
and (12) follows. When k = 2n+ 1, we have
wu,2n+1 =
E
n5
, wu′,2n+1 =
F
n5
, au,2n+1 =
F
n5
, and au′,2n+1 =
E
n5
,
and (12) follows. This finishes the proof of the lemma.
By Lemma 4, Lemma 5 and Lemma 2, we immediately get the following corollary concerning p2n+1.
Corollary 1. p2n+1 = 1.
Proof. First, by Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we have
w2n+1[Tu, Tv : u ∈ U,v ∈ V ]− a2n+1[Tu, Tv : u ∈ U,v ∈ V ] ≥ 0.
However, the construction implies that
w2n+1
[
Ti : i ∈ [2n]
]
= 2n ·
1
n12
=
2
n11
and a2n+1
[
Ti : i ∈ [2n]
]
= 0.
As a result, w2n+1[T2]− a2n+1[T2] ≥ 2/n
11 ≫ 3/n13. It then follows from Lemma 2 that p2n+1 = 1.
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5.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Now we let x′ and y′ denote the two vectors obtained in (7). By Lemma 1 we have x′k, y
′
k ∈ [0, 1] for all
k ∈ [n]. We will prove the following two properties of (x′,y′) and use them to prove Theorem 4.
Property 2. For all 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n, we have
(Ai −Aj)y
′T < −ǫ =⇒ x′i = 0; and (17)
x′(Bi −Bj) < −ǫ =⇒ y
′
i = 0, (18)
where ǫ = n−6, Ai denotes the ith row vector of A, and Bi denotes the ith column vector of B.
Property 3. There exist i and j ∈ [n] such that x′i = 1 and y
′
j = 1.
Now assume that x′ and y′ satisfy both properties. In particular, Property 3 implies that x′,y′ 6= 0.
As a result, we can normalize them to get two probability distribution x and y using (8). Before proving
these two properties, we show that (x,y) must be an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A,B).
Proof of Theorem 4. Since both x and y are probability distributions, we only need to show that (x,y)
satisfies (1) and (2) for all i, j : 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n. We only prove (1) here.
Assume Aiy
T + ǫ < Ajy
T , then we have
(Ai −Aj)y
′T = (Ai −Aj)y
T ·

∑
k∈[n]
y′k

 < −ǫ
since
∑
k∈[n] y
′
k ≥ 1 by Property 3. As a result, by Property 2 we have x
′
i = 0 and thus, xi = 0.
Finally, we prove Property 2 and Property 3.
Proof of Property 2. We only prove (17) for the case when i = 1, j = 2. (18) can be proved similarly.
Let u = (1, 2, 1) and u′ = (2, 1, 1). Let C and D be the two nonnegative vectors defined in (13), and
E and F be the two nonnegative numbers defined in (14). We have
C−D = A1 −A2 and E +
∑
k∈[n]
Ck = F +
∑
k∈[n]
Dk. (19)
Assume (A1 −A2)y
′T < −ǫ. Then the money of Tu left after purchasing the bundle in (15) is
p1 ·
1
n4
+
∑
k∈[n]
pn+k ·
Ck
n5
+ p2n+1 ·
E
n5
−
∑
k∈[n]
pn+k ·
Dk
n5
− p2n+1 ·
F
n5
.
By Corollary 1, we have p2n+1 = 1. Using (19), we can simplify the equation to be the following:
p1 ·
1
n4
+
1
n5
∑
k∈[n]
y′k · (Ck −Dk) = p1 ·
1
n4
+
1
n5
(A1 −A2)y
′T < p1 ·
1
n4
−
ǫ
n5
. (20)
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This implies that the amount au,1 of G1 that Tu buys is smaller than
1
n4
−
ǫ
p1n5
≤
1
n4
−
1
2n11
since ǫ = n−6. However, we have wu,1 = 1/n
4 and thus,
wu,1 − au,1 > 1/(2n
11). (21)
On the other hand, it is easy to check that wu′,1 = 0 and au′,1 = 0. By Lemma 4 and 5, we have
w1[Tu, Tv : u ∈ U,v ∈ V ]− a1[Tu, Tv : u ∈ U,v ∈ V ] >
1
2n11
. (22)
Next we bound w1
[
Ti : i ∈ [2n]
]
− a1
[
Ti : i ∈ [2n]
]
. By the construction, a1
[
Ti : i ∈ [2n], i 6= 1
]
= 0 and
a1,1 =
p2n+1 ·
1
n12
p1
≤
1
n12
,
since p2n+1 = 1. Therefore, w1
[
Ti : i ∈ [2n]
]
− a1
[
Ti : i ∈ [2n]
]
≥ −1/n12. Combining (22), we have
w1[T2]− a1[T2] >
1
2n11
−
1
n12
≫
3
n13
.
It then follows from Lemma 2 that p1 = 1 and thus, x
′
1 = 0.
Proof of Property 3. Let ℓ ∈ [n] be one of the indices that maximizes Aℓy
′T , then we show that x′ℓ = 1.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that ℓ = 1.
First, we consider v = (i, j, 2) and v′ = (j, i, 2) in V . In the proof of Lemma 4, we showed that
wu,n+k + wu′,n+k = au,n+k + au′,n+k,
for all pairs u = (i, j, 1) and u′ = (j, i, 1), and all k ∈ [n]. Similarly, we can prove that
wv,1 + wv′,1 = av,1 + av′,1. (23)
Second, for every u = (i, j, 1) ∈ U , we always have wu,1 = au,1. This is because
1. If i 6= 1, then wu,1 = au,1 = 0; and
2. If i = 1, then by (20), the money of Tu left after purchasing the bundle of goods in (15) is at
least p1/n
4, so wu,1 = au,1 = 1/n
4.
As a result, we have w1[Tu, Tv : u ∈ U,v ∈ V ] = a1[Tu, Tv : u ∈ U,v ∈ V ].
However, the amount of G1 that T1 buys is
p2n+1 ·
1
n12
p1
≥
1
2n12
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and thus, w1
[
Ti, i ∈ [2n]
]
− a1
[
Ti : i ∈ [2n]
]
≤ −1/(2n12). Putting everything together, we have
w1[T2]− a1[T2] ≤ −
1
2n12
≪ −
3
n13
.
By Lemma 3, we conclude that p1 = 2 and thus, x
′
1 = 1.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we prove Theorem 2. To this end, we first show that under the conditions of Theorem 2,
M has at least one quasi-equilibrium (see the definition below). Then we show that any quasi-equilibrium
of M is indeed a market equilibrium.
Definition 11. A quasi-equilibrium of M is a (normalized) price vector p ∈ Rn+ such that there exists
an allocation X = {xi ∈ R
n
+ : i ∈ [m]} which has the following properties:
1. The market clears: For every good Gj ∈ G,
∑
i∈[m]
xi,j ≤
∑
i∈[m]
wi,j;
In particular, if pj > 0, then ∑
i∈[m]
xi,j =
∑
i∈[m]
wi,j;
2. For every trader Ti ∈ T , at least one of the following is true:
(a) xi ∈ OPT(i,p);
(b) p · xi = p ·wi = 0 (zero income).
The difference between market equilibria and quasi-equilibria is that in the latter, we do not require
the optimality of allocations for traders with a zero income: If a trader has a zero income, then we can
assign her any bundle of zero cost. However, if p is a quasi-equilibrium and the income of every trader
is positive with respect to p, then by definition p must be a market equilibrium.
In [29] Maxfield gave a set of conditions that are sufficient for the existence of a quasi-equilibrium in
an exchange market. We use the following simplified version [29]:
Theorem 5 ([29]). An exchange market M has a quasi-equilibrium p if
1. For each trader Ti ∈ T , its utility function ui : R
n
+ → R is both continuous and quasi-concave; and
2. For each trader Ti ∈ T , ui is non-satiable, i.e., for any x ∈ R
n
+, there exists a vector y ∈ R
n
+ such
that ui(y) > ui(x).
Now we use Theorem 5 to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, it is easy to check that if M is an additively separable PLC market that is
strongly connected, then it satisfies both conditions in Theorem 5. In particular, ui is non-satiable since
the economy graph ofM is strongly connected and thus, there exists a j ∈ [n] such that ri,j(·) is strictly
monotone. As a result, M must have a quasi-equilibrium p. We use X = {xi ∈ R
n
+ : i ∈ [m]} to denote
an allocation that clears the market. Since p 6= 0, there is at least one trader in T , say T1 ∈ T , has a
positive income.
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Second, we show that for every trader, its income is positive and thus, p is indeed an equilibrium of
M. Suppose this is not true, then there is at least one trader T2 whose income is zero. Since the economy
graph is strongly connected, there is a directed path from T2 to T1. As a result, there must be a directed
edge T3T4 on the path such that the income of T3 is zero and the income of T4 is positive. By definition,
there exists a j ∈ [n] such that the amount of Gj that T3 owns at the beginning is positive and the PLC
utility function of T4 with respect to Gj is strictly monotone. However, since the income of T3 is zero,
we have pj = 0 and thus, the amount of Gj that T4 wants to buy is +∞, contradicting the assumption
that p is a quasi-equilibrium of M (since the income of T4 is positive but the bundle she receives is not
optimal).
Now we have proved the existence of a market equilibrium p. The second part of Theorem 2 follows
from the work of Devanur and Kannan [13]. In [13], the authors proposed an algorithm for computing a
market equilibrium in an additively separable PLC market5. They divide the whole search space Rn+ of
p into “cells” C ⊂ Rn+ using hyperplanes. Then for each cell C, there is a rational linear program LPC
that characterizes the set of market equilibria in C: p ∈ C is an equilibrium of M if and only if it is a
feasible solution to LPC (In particular, if LPC has no feasible solution then there is no equilibrium in C).
Moreover, the size of LPC , for any cell C, is polynomial in the size of M.
Now let p be a market equilibrium ofM, which is not necessarily rational. We let C∗ denote the cell
that p lies in, then p must be a feasible solution to LPC∗ . Since LPC∗ is rational, it must have a rational
solution p∗ and the number of bits one need to describe p∗ is polynomial in the size of LPC∗ and thus,
is polynomial in the size of M. Theorem 2 then follows since p∗ is also an equilibrium of M.
5When the number of goods is constant, the algorithm is polynomial-time.
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